China & Taiwan: A Route to Conflict or Concession?
(1)A Line of trees to break the wind
(2)And beyond them other
(3)Lines of trees
(4)And beyond them other
(5)Lines of trees
(6)And now the sea and the lines made by the waves
(7)And now the sea and the lines made by the waves
Lin Heng-t’ai. Modern Taiwanese poet known for his expressions of unique Taiwanese culture & identity. (NB.:The numbers at the beginning of each are for reference only).
The rapid economic growth of China over the past four decades has long led to the belief (in the West) that at some point it will attempt to reassert its traditional hegemony over East Asia (1), by peaceful means or otherwise.
Starting closest to home, bringing Hong Kong, Macao and Taiwan back into the fold are, perhaps, the first stepping stones in what may be a long, hard grind to fulfilment for China.
Throughout the longest part of the history of China Taiwan has been an ever-present, inclusive part of China. That all changed in 1949. The end of the Chinese Civil War resulted in victory for the Communists, whilst many nationalists escaped across the Taiwan Straits to take refuge among Taiwan’s many islands.
China, however, has never given up its claim to Taiwan despite the growing time apart, with Xi Jinping pushing the Taiwanese harder than ever to accept Chinese rule saying that Taiwan ‘must, and will be reunited’ with China, though he has always declined to put a time-frame on the matter.
Successive leaders of the CCP have promised a high degree of (political) autonomy (for Taiwan) under the One China, two systems policy, should the two ever be reunited. This promise has, however, rung hollow of late given the unrest and crackdowns in Hong Kong who were promised the exact same thing following the British handover to China in 1997.
A spectacularly rugged island, the main island of Taiwan (also known as The Republic of China) is only 394 kms long, and just 144 kms across at its widest point, yet boasts a staggering 258 peaks over 3,000 m high. It is home now to some 23 million people who support a democratically elected government under current President Tsai Ing-wen.
But, the current Taiwanese Western-style multi-pluralistic political system does mean there remain some differences of opinion among Taiwanese political leaders as to the exact relationship of Taiwan and its people to mainland China. This difference of opinion between political leaders, and between China and Taiwan themselves, is to a large extent based upon the 1992 Consensus.
Drawn up between the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and the then ruling Kuomintang (KMT) Party, the content and wording of the Consensus is considered to be open to interpretation, its meaning not totally agreed upon by all parties concerned.
China claims that it unequivocally ties Taiwan to the mainland and is thus, the basic agreement upon which reunification should occur. Indeed the KMT drafted Taiwanese Constitution acknowledges that Taiwan is indeed a part of China, though recent election victories for more democratic leaning parties in Taiwan have led some to question the legitimacy of the Consensus and what it actually means for the future of Taiwan.
The President’s Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) have questioned the Consensus, with President Tsai suggesting that a new formulation should be adopted going forward that spells out how the China-Taiwan relationship should develop in the future, suggesting that the re-wording should ‘safeguard the sovereignty and territory of the Republic of China’ with respect to the mainland.
This suggestion has been rejected out of hand by the CCP who have made reunification a cornerstone of their One China policy, with Xi Jinping calling reunification ‘inevitable,’ stating uncategorically that the process will ‘not be stopped by anyone or any force’; such words no doubt, a veiled threat to the US should they decide to intervene (on Taiwan’s behalf) in the event of hostilities breaking out.
US policy towards Taiwan could perhaps also be interpreted as somewhat ambiguous. Having recognised China’s One Policy, and with it in effect China’s claim to Taiwan, the US then offered increasing amounts of economic and military support (see Figure 1.) for Taiwan through the Taiwan Relations Act (2). Indeed the new US administration has hinted that strengthening those ties may be on the cards as a priority, with Anthony Blinken saying they are looking to cement a bilateral trade deal with Taiwan ‘in the coming weeks.’
But will this be enough to deter the Chinese from changing peaceful overtures into something much more sinister and forceful?
Well, perhaps not!
If opinion polls in China are to be believed then Xi Jinping has the backing of the Chinese people who appear to be growing increasingly impatient for Taiwan to be brought back into the family fold, by whatever means necessary.
Popular opinion can though be easy to garner, especially given China’s control over the media and the overwhelming military strength it possesses in relation to Taiwan. But that support could crumble easily enough should any forceful confrontation not go the way it has been suggested and the Taiwanese begin a concerted defence of their island and their chosen freedoms.
Since 1949 relations between Taiwan and the Chinese mainland have waxed and waned, but the longer the island remains estranged from the mainland the more the Taiwanese see themselves as culturally and politically distinct from their Chinese cousins.
The ‘lines of trees’ in line 1 of the Heng-t’ai poem above, are supposed to represent Taiwan’s new found Western polity, their laws and values, with the ‘wind’ metaphorically breaking the old KMT laws and constitution. The ‘lines of trees’ in lines 3 & 5 symbolising Taiwan’s newly discovered independence standing tall, with the lines of the ‘waves’ that follow on in lines 6 & 7 indicating the rolling opportunities that the liberated nation now sees on its horizon.
So even though Taiwan has not gone so far as to declare full independence, there would seem to be a growing awareness among the Taiwanese of the benefits that a capitalist, democratic system might offer, and this as much as anything might embolden the Chinese to step forward more aggressively, and sooner rather than later.
And while relations between Taiwan and China have floundered of late, it’s true to say that the last real crisis point was sometime ago.
In 1996 the Third Taiwan Straits crisis occurred during negotiations to normalise relations between the US and China.
President Clinton had previously reaffirmed US support for the One China policy (in 1993), basing US support on the rather ambiguously worded 3rd Communique, stating that it was ‘the right policy for the United States,’ but that it did not ‘preclude us (the US) from following the Taiwan Relations Act’ and forging a strong economic relationship with Taiwan (3).
The tacit and ambiguous understanding being that the US would accept Taiwan as a ‘Special Administrative Region’ of China, along with Hong Kong and Macao, though the exact nature of this understanding has never been clear or, for that matter, tested.
But, as Kissinger says in his book On China, this understanding relied to a large extent on the Taiwanese not rocking the proverbial political boat, by challenging any of the raw statements in the 3rd Communique. In 1995 at a delegation in Beijing then Vice-Premier of the CCP Qian Qichen had told Kissinger that China had ‘no manoeuvre-room on Taiwan’ and that China would not ‘give up (its) principled position,’ (4) thereby once again reaffirming China’s desire for full reunification.
But Lee Teng-hui, a candidate for President in the then forthcoming 1996 Presidential elections was not playing by the same set of rules as far as the Chinese were concerned.
A partly Japanese, partly US educated politician — a vile mixture of devilish influences as far as the Chinese were concerned — Lee stood proudly for Taiwanese independence, and arranged for many international Taiwanese delegations to be sent to prominent world capitals where they insisted they were given all the trappings due to an independent nation. With many nations agreeing to welcome them, much to Beijing’s chagrin.
As the election approached China ramped up its military exercises in the Straits, conducting many so-called ‘missile tests’ off the coast of SE China, then more threateningly still, sending yet more missiles, supposedly with ‘dummy warheads,’ down the Taiwan Straits itself. The US responded to this show of Chinese aggression by sending the carrier Nimitz to the Straits under the veiled pretext of ‘avoiding bad weather’ while still proclaiming support for One China and simultaneously warning Taiwan not to react provocatively to the Chinese aggression (5).
Now, some three decades later the same foggy, ambiguous political situation lingers, and Taiwan is once again the focus of increased Chinese military activity as well as a massive and ongoing campaign of cyber attacks that attempts time and again to access government information and data on a daily basis. A concerted effort by the Chinese has also been made to subvert Taiwanese elections and undermine their democracy in a bid to weaken the resolve of the people of Taiwan and to sow political divisions within society.
But Chinese efforts are falling short with many Taiwanese no longer identifying themselves as part Chinese, but as wholly Taiwanese. Furthermore, with a strong, diverse economy that includes being the largest manufacturer of industrially advanced semiconductors — a vital component of all computers, mobiles and advanced communication devices — Taiwan is in a strong position to ask for help from the US, among others, in its defence should it be needed.
This hasn’t, however, stopped The Economist recently calling Taiwan ‘the most dangerous place on earth’. With some US experts advocating for ‘unambiguous support’ for Taiwan, whilst others remain more circumspect, wary of provoking a forceful response from China’s fast growing military capabilities, newly emboldened and confident after decades of modernisation and investment.
And while China keeps its sights fixed firmly on reunification (with Taiwan), ultimately it is the potential costs and losses, both militarily and economically, of any military engagement that may determine any future course of Chinese military action. After crunching the numbers Ian Easton writing in The Diplomat suggests that an amphibious assault may be too costly across the board to be attempted, especially if the US were to intervene.
But others suggest the temptation may be too strong to resist, and that any military action may succeed relatively rapidly and at a relatively low cost, even allowing for the possibility of US involvement.
This delicate situation is no doubt one of the Biden administrations most pressing and complex foreign policy challenges, especially since an all out assault by Chinese forces is not the only way any confrontation might go. There are manifold possibilities with an equal number of possible countermeasures that might be employed both by the US and by Taiwan.
Beefing up and modernising the defensive capabilities of US military resources in Asia seems to be a logical first step though for Biden and one that is surely long overdue. The end game must surely be to make any military action by China too costly to even attempt a forceful reconciliation. However, achieving that end game is no easy task, but one that is surely the most favourable outcome for all concerned given the risk that any US-China confrontation over Taiwan may inadvertently spillover into a much broader, and infinitely more costly engagement for everyone.
Time is on the side of the Chinese however, who may end up playing the long game. The risk for them then becomes calculating how long that long game should be…
References
- SP Huntington: The Clash of Civilisations and the remaking of world order. 1996.
- Henry Kissinger: On China. 2011.
- Kissinger: Ibid.
- Kissinger: Ibid
- Kissinger: Ibid.
