The Iraq Elections: A Dead End or the Start of Something Better?
The febrile political situation in Iraq has heated up further following the 10th October elections. The countries fifth election since the US led overthrow of Saddam Hussein in 2003 was marked by apathy and mistrust, particularly among younger first-time voters, leading to a record low turnout estimated at 41% with the biggest losers being the pro-Iranian bloc who have labelled the election a ‘scam’ indicating that they believe the results were ‘manipulated’ and fixed against them in favour of the biggest winner, controversial Shia cleric Muqtada al-Sadr.
On Tuesday evening Hadi al-Ameri, leader of the second biggest parliamentary party prior to the election, the Fatah Alliance, called the results ‘fabricated,’ his office later adding that (Fatah) ‘will defend the votes of our candidates and voters with full force’ leading to fears that military options are not off the table and a solution to their grievance may be sought through violence.
The Fatah Alliance, the political wing of the al-Hashd al-Shaabi paramilitary movement, saw their 48 seats dwindle dramatically down to about a dozen (the exact number has not yet been confirmed) in what will be a big blow for the Iranians who had hoped this election would provide further political leverage in the form of a more pliable pro-Iranian leader, to aid in their ongoing efforts to oust the remaining US armed forces, as well as help quell anti-Iranian voices in the Iraqi parliament and media.
Iran had sought to use the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, Quds Force (or IRGC — QF) (previously led by Qasem Soleimani — assassinated on 2nd January 2020 by a US drone strike) backed Shia militia party, Kata’ib Hezbollah, in a bid to bolster their influence by fielding 31 candidates under a ‘Huquq (rights) Movement’ banner in a tactic that failed miserably. The results thus far have yielded but a single disappointing seat for Kata’ib Hezbollah, a spokesman saying afterwards, “The brothers in the Iraqi resistance should prepare for a sensitive stage that requires wisdom and close observation from us."
Perhaps the only positive for Iran in what had been a pretty black day was the partial resurgence of former Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki’s State of Law party which had also performed strongly to become the likely second largest party. Maliki, a Shia, who was ousted from power in 2014, had during his 8 years in power promoted a pro-Iranian agenda and with outright sectarian policies that may have ultimately led to the rise of the Sunni extremist group ISIS (and 1.), held a meeting at his house for the Shia party leaders to decide how to respond to what they had called a ‘coup’ by Sadr which had been part of a ‘British-American plot.’
Incumbent Prime Minister, Mustafa al-Kadhimi, who had come to power last year after a vicious crackdown following civil unrest by a mostly youth led ‘Tishreen’ protest movement had caused the deaths of perhaps 600 protesters in late 2019 and led to the eventual resignation of then Prime Minsiter, Adel Abdul Mahdi, said the election had been the fulfilment of “our promise and our duty” to the people of Iraq.
Kadhimi, a staunch US ally and supporter, would be the Biden administrations choice to remain Prime Minister for another term though US leverage in the region is overwhelmingly weak right now following the withdrawal from Afghanistan. Despite Sadr having won the most seats it is by no means certain that he will take over from Kadhimi who will no doubt retain the support of many parliamentary factions.
The US have no direct link with Sadr, who has always been vocal in his resistance to the presence of US troops in Iraq and would no doubt push for their removal should he come to power himself.
Certainly Sadr is in the driving seat having gained 73 of the 329 parliamentary seats, but the low turnout threatens the legitimacy of the election results. Should he come to power Sadr would likely change very little on the home front and may just prolong the general discontent among the younger electorate who expect further stagnation of the political system and the corruption to continue on unabated.
The call for a boycott of the vote had spread among the young ‘Tishreen’ protesters in a bid to delegitimise and undermine the election, citing foreign interference (particularly from the pro-Iranian parties), continued corruption, sectarianism, the huge prevalence of weapons in the country and a perceived lack of security for voters and independent candidates alike. That said, a few independent ‘Tishreen’ candidates did stand, mostly in the regions South of the Baghdad, and are thought to have won 11 seats in Karbala and Najaf.
However, in Kurdistan the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) exceeded expectations gaining 7 seats overall despite garnering 2% less of the vote. This has been put down to the low turnout which saved the KDP and the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) from facing ‘an existential threat.’ The PUK won some 17 seats, with the opposition New Generation party increasing its number of seats from 3 to 8, a number that may have been much higher had the young not adhered to the boycott.
But it is perhaps significant that New Generation have come from nowhere to now be the third biggest party in Kurdistan indicating that a change may be in the wind across the province.
After the election KDP leader, Massoud Barzani, called for Kurdish parties to unite and “work together for their mutual objective and high interest of Kurdistan.”
If hopes are relatively high now in Kurdistan the same cannot be said across the country as a whole.
Years of rampant corruption have left the country in a deep crisis, with the public services (water, electricity, etc) barely able to function and an unemployment rate of 14%, all this in a nation growing by more than a million each year. With almost 60% of the population aged 25 Iraq is a young and growing nation and, as of 2019, 1 in 4 of the under 25’s remain unemployed will little future prospect of change within a system that has changed little over the last few parliamentary terms. There is growing disenchantment with the political elites among the young who see the elites as only wishing to maintain the corrupt and self-serving status quo.
Fed up with the paramilitary groups (like the Fatah Alliance), who may have saved the day in the fight against ISIS, but are not the agents of political change and progress the young protesters desire, which makes the call for the election boycott all the more puzzling after the ‘Tishreen’ revolution had already wrought such dramatic change. The decision to boycott the vote may well have been something akin to shooting themselves in the foot, and could well have helped maintain the very party system the protesters had sought to over-throw in favour a more reformist, less sectarian option.
The protest movement has perhaps suffered from the lack of a strong leader willing stand up to unify the various threads of discontent under a single reformist banner. The few protest seats gained may ultimately seed the reform minded movements, but for it to grow into something more substantial may take yet more time when the need for change is in the now and present.
Opinions seem to be divided right now on what the result of this election means to people on the street. Some are pessimistic in the extreme, whilst listening to Al Jazeera’s The Stream on 14th October with young Iraqi activist and artist Dashni Morad and New Lines Institute analyst Rasha al Aqeedi, the tone was much more upbeat and hopeful.
It seems likely that in the short term at least, coalition negotiations and the appointment of the next Prime Minister will take some time to resolve, and whoever assumes power this term is likely to see few fundamental changes for your average Iraqi.
The bigger question in the longer term is whether the protest movement will falter in the wake of this oddly, schizophrenic election. A lot may depend on whether the protest seats won will have any bearing or effect on how things go from here.
At stake is not just the future of democracy in Iraq, but also the chance for a peaceful, prosperous future for young Iraqis, who it seems more than anything just want to move beyond the hated sectarian divide and violence of the past decades to work together to build a solid, free, democratic foundation in Iraq that would benefit all and not just the few.
